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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action commenced upon Appellant's filing a Complaint for Judicial Dissolution on July
27, 2005 ("Dissolution Complaint"). Appellant's Complaint sought judicial dissolution under Idaho
Code (LC.)§ 53-643, and a decree dissolving Henderson Investment Properties ("HIP"). HIP is an
Idaho limited liability company in which Appellant is a member. The Respondents, Roger and Lisa
Henderson, are also members of HIP.
Following a court trial, the trial judge fonnd that Appellant established only one of two
elements required for judicial dissolution under LC. § 53-643. Specifically, the Court found that the
parties were deadlocked in the management of HIP's affairs, but that Appellant failed to show
irreparable injury to HIP as a result of the deadlock. The Court subsequently dismissed another
action filed by Appellant against the Respondents which had been consolidated into the action for
dissolution.
The Respondents moved for an award of costs and fees incurred by them. Respondents
contended they were entitled to such an award on three grounds: (1) LC.§ 12-120, (2) LC.§ 12-121,
and (3) a provision for costs and attorney fees contained in the Operating Agreement for HIP.
The trial court denied Respondents' motion for costs and fees under LC.§ 12-120 or§ 12121. However, the Court awarded costs and fees to Respondents pursuant to a provision in the HIP
Operating Agreement. Appellant argues the trial court erred in awarding costs and fees, because the
provision of the HIP Operating Agreement upon which the trial court relied does not apply nnder the
circumstances of this case.
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Ralph Henderson filed the Dissolution Complaint on July 27, 2005. R. pp. 1-5. Count I of
the Dissolution Complaint sought judicial dissolution under LC. § 53-643(l)(a). R. 4. Count II
sought judicial dissolution under I.C. § 53-643(1 )(b). R. p. 4.
Respondents' Answer was filed August 26, 2005. R. pp. 6-9. The Answer asserted three
affirmative defenses. The First Affirmative Defense alleged the Dissolution Complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. R. p. 8. The Second Affirmative Defense claimed
that certain promises or agreements "alleged by the Plaintiff [Ralph] to have been made by the
Defendants [Roger and Lisa], which is not in writing or contained in the parties' Operating
Agreement as amended, is unenforceable .... " R. p. 8. The Third Affirmative Defense was based on
waiver and/or equitable estoppel. R. p. 8.
Thereafter, Ralph filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on April I 0, 2007
("Declaratory Complaint"). R. pp. 48-70. This action sought a declaratory judgment that Roger and
Lisa were dissociated from HIP under LC.§ 53-64l(l)(e), on the grounds that more than 120 days
had elapsed from the filing of the action for judicial dissolution. R. p. 51.
By Minute Entry & Order, filed May 21, 2007, Ralph's suit for judicial dissolution and his
suit for declaratory judgment were consolidated. R. pp. I 25-126. This action was taken sua sponte
by the Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (LR.C.P.) 42(a). R. p. 126.
Trial on the Dissolution Complaint was held June 6-8, 2007. R. pp. 127-129. Thereafter,
the Court took the matter under advisement. R. p. 129.
In its Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed August 2,
2007, the Court refused judicial dissolution, holding that Ralph had failed to show "actual or
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threatened irreparable injury" as a result of the deadlock or "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent acts"
by the Respondents as managers of HIP. R. p. 140.
Subsequently, the Court dismissed the action for declaratory judgment under I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6). R. pp. 169-170.
The Court then issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Fees and Costs on
February 12, 2008. R. pp. 175-187. In that decision, the Court determined Respondents were not
entitled to attorney fees and court costs under LC. §§ 12-120 or 12-121; however, the Court did
award the Respondents fees and costs based upon a certain provision in the HIP Operating
Agreement. Followingjudgment on the February 12, 2008 decision, this appeal was filed on March
21, 2008. R. pp. 190-194.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This litigation stems from a family business endeavor that went sour. The persons involved
were Appellant, Ralph J. Henderson ("Ralph"), his late wife, Lena R. Henderson ("Lena"), and the
Respondents, Roger E. Henderson ("Roger") and Roger's wife, Lisa A. Henderson ("Lisa"). Roger
is the son of Ralph and Lena.
On or about September 27, 2000, Ralph, Roger, Lisa and Lena formed Henderson Investment
Properties, L.L. C. ("HIP"). R. p. 2. The Operating Agreement for Henderson Investment Properties,
L.L.C. ("Operating Agreement"), was signed on that same date. R. pp. 54, 63. Included in the
Operating Agreement were an "Appendix A," which contained definitions applicable to the
Operating Agreement (R. pp. 64-65), Schedule I - List of Members (R. p. 66), and Schedule II Membership Interests (R. p. 67).
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Accordingto the Operating Agreement, HIP was formed in order to operate a Jimmy John's
Gourmet Sandwich Shop in Pocatello, Idaho. See Operating Agreement at 2,

'Ii III-A (R. p.

55).

According to the Operating Agreement, Ralph, Lena, Roger and Lisa made initial capital
contributions to HIP in the amount of$33,000.00 each, giving each individual a 25% membership
interest in HIP. See Operating Agreement at 2 'If IV-A (R. p. 55) and Schedule II (R. p. 67).
However, Ralph contended that Roger and Lisa made no such initial capital contributions to HIP.

See Dissolution Complaint at 2 'If 11 (R. p. 2).
Before the first year of operations for HIP, Lena passed away on August 28, 2001.
Dissolution Complaint at 2 'If 12 (R. p. 2). In January of 2002, Ralph, Roger and Lisa amended the
Operating Agreement whereby Ralph was assigned Lena's membership interest in HIP, resulting in
Ralph owning a 50% interest in the company. Dissolution Complaint at 2 'If 13 (R. p. 2).
During the course ofHIP's business operations, Ralph, Roger and Lisa became deadlocked
about Roger and Lisa's management of HIP. Dissolution Complaint at 3 'If 19 (R. p. 3).
On July 27, 2005, Ralph commenced this litigation by filing the Dissolution Complaint. R.
p. 1. The Dissolution Complaint sought judicial dissolution of HIP on two grounds.
First, Ralph contended that HIP's members were "deadlocked in the management ofHIP's
affairs, and because no member [held] a majority of the membership interests, no member of HIP
[could] resolve the deadlock without the cooperation of the other two members." Dissolution
Complaint at 4 'If 28 (R. p. 4). Ralph further alleged that, as a result, HIP suffered or would suffer
irreparable harm. Dissolution Complaint at 4 'If 29 (R. p. 4). See generally I.C. § 53-643(l)(a).
Second, Ralph asserted that "Roger and/or Lisa, managers of HIP, have misappropriated HIP
assets for personal use," that these illegal, oppressive or fraudulent acts directly contravened the
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Operating Agreement, and that as a result, HIP had or would suffer irreparable injury. Dissolution
Complaint at 4 ,r,r 31-32 (R. p. 4). See generally I.C. § 53-643(l)(b).
The Defendants served an Answer on August 26, 2005 ("Answer"). R. pp. 6-9. In their
Answer, Roger and Lisa admitted the Operating Agreement was executed. Answer at 2 ,r 3 (R. p.
7). Their Answer generally denied the allegations that formed the basis for Ralph's judicial
dissolution claims. Answer at 2 ,r 6 (R. p. 7).
Respondents' Answer also asserted three affirmative defenses. The First Affirmative
Defense alleged the Dissolution Complaint failed to state a claim upon which reliefcould be granted.
Answer at 3 (R. p. 8). The Second Affirmative Defense invoked the statute of frauds as to alleged
oral or other agreements not contained in the HIP Operating Agreement. Answer at 3 (R. p. 8). The
Third Affirmative Defense cited waiver and estoppel. Answer at 3 (R. p. 8).
On April 10, 2007, Ralph commenced another lawsuit against HIP, Roger and Lisa by filing
the Declaratory Complaint. The Declaratory Complaint sought a judgment that Roger and Lisa were
dissociated from HIP by virtue ofI.C. § 53-641(1 )(e ), because more than 120 days had elapsed from
the filing of the earlier action for judicial dissolution. Declaratory Complaint at 4 ,r,r 18-21 (R. p.
51).
Trial on the Dissolution Complaint was held June 6-8, 2007. R. pp. 127-129. The Court
took the matter under advisement. R. p. 129.
On August 2, 2007, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. R. pp. 134-15 5. The Court refused judicial dissolution, finding that, while the
evidence established deadlock in the management of HIP, the evidence failed to show (1) "actual or
threatened irreparable injury" resulting from the deadlock, or (2) "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent
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acts on the part of Roger and Lisa, as managers of the company." R. p. 140.

The Court

acknowledged the evidence presented at trial by Ralph, which showed violations of the HIP
Operating Agreement, was offered to show irreparable injury to HIP. R. p. 140. The Court agreed
the HIP Operating Agreement had been violated, but not to the irreparable harm of HIP. R. pp. 140141.
As for the Declaratory Complaint, the Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). R. pp. 169-170.
On February 12, 2008, the Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for
Fees and Costs. R. pp. 175-187. The Court ruled Roger and Lisa were not entitled to attorney fees
and court costs under LC. § 12-120 or§ 12-121. However, the Court awarded Roger and Lisa fees
and costs based upon a provision in the HIP Operating Agreement. R. pp. 177-178. That provision
read as follows:
In any action or proceeding brought to enforce any provision of this
Agreement, or where any provision is validly asserted as a defense,
the successful party is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees
in addition to any other available remedy.
Operating Agreement for Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C., at 9 'if XIV(G), R. p. 62. Based
on this provision, the Court also awarded Roger and Lisa fees and costs incurred in defending the
Declaratory Complaint. R. p. 184.
The Judgment Awarding Costs and Attorney Fees to Defendants Roger and Lisa Henderson
was filed on February 15, 2008. R. pp. 188-189. This appeal followed. R. p. 190-194.
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the trial court err in awarding Respondents their attorney fees under the Operating
Agreement for Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C.?

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An award of attorney fees in a civil action is discretionary and thus reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547,549, 181 P.3d 473,475 (2008). In reviewing a trial
court's exercise of discretion, an appellate court uses a three-step analysis: (I) whether the trial judge
properly perceived the issue as a discretionary one, (2) whether the judge acted within the bo1mdaries
of that discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices available, and
(3) whether the decision was reached by an exercise ofreason. Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 10,
189 P.3d 467,472 (2008).

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
RESPONDENTS THEIR ATTORNEY FEES.
A court may award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party when allowed by statute or
contract. l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Thus, Idaho adheres to the "American Rule" which requires a party to
bear its own attorney fees unless a contract or statute provides otherwise. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho
137,143,911 P.2d 133, 139 (1996). Accordingly, attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing
party only when provided for by statute or contract. Ervin Construction Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho
695,704,874 P.2d 506,515 (1993); Burns v. County ofBoundary, 120 Idaho 623,626,818 P.2d
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327,330 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 120 Idaho 614, 818 P.2d 318 (1991). In this case, there is no basis,
in court rules or Idaho statute, for an award of attorney fees to the Respondents.

A. The trial court correctly ruled Respondents were not
entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).
Citing Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 903 P.3d 1321 (1995), the trial court
concluded an action for judicial dissolution was not grounded in a commercial transaction sufficient
to invoke LC.§ 12-120(3). R. p. 179. The Kelly case involved dissolution of a partnership. Kelly,
127 Idaho at 627, 903 P.2d at 1324. The instant case was one for dissolution of a limited liability
company. As the Supreme Court held in Kelly, if the gravamen of the action is "to enforce a
statutory scheme of dissolution," LC.§ 12-120(3) does not apply. Kelly, 127 Idaho at 631, 903 P.2d
at 1328. Because the case at bar was to enforce the dissolution provisions of the Idaho Limited
Liability Company Act, the trial court was correct in declining to award attorney fees under LC. §
12-120(3).

B. The trial court correctly ruled Respondents were not
entitled to attorney fees under J.C. § 12-121.
The Court found this "case involved many subjects of disputed facts and some areas of
unusual legal issues," and characterized its decisions on those issues as "close ones." R. p. 179.
Having so found, the Court was correct in holding that Respondents were not entitled to attorney fees
under LC.§ 12-121.

C. The trial court erred in awarding Respondents their attorney
fees under the terms of the HIP Operating Agreement.
The HIP Operating Agreement provided as follows:
In any action or proceeding brought to enforce any provision of this
Agreement, or where any provision is validly asserted as a defense,
the successful party is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees
in addition to any other available remedy.
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Operating Agreement for Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C., at 9 ,i XIV(G), R. p. 62.

In

awarding Respondents their attorney fees under this provision, the Court concluded that "Ralph
sought to enforce a variety of Operating Agreement provisions, for the purpose of obtaining
dissolution of the business entity, and he was unsuccessful in that pursuit." R. p. 178.
However, the Court was erroneous in this regard. The provision at issue does not apply for
at least two reasons. First, the actions for judicial dissolution and declaratory judgment were not
instituted to enforce any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. Second, the Respondents never
asserted a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement as a defense to either action brought by Ralph.

l. Neither of the lawsuits instituted by Ralph were brought to
enforce any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement.
As noted, the first action filed by Ralph sought judicial dissolution of HIP. R. pp. 1-5.
Obviously, an action for judicial dissolution of a limited liability company does not seek enforcement
of the operating agreement for the limited liability company; rather, it seeks to dissolve the limited
liability company itself. If a court grants the relief requested, the operating agreement is rendered
meaningless - a document which governed a limited liability company that no longer exists. Thus,
a dissolution action is anything but an effort to enforce an operating agreement. The desired result
will render the operating agreement moot.
The court itself acknowledged that evidence offered at trial by Ralph, showing violations of
the Operating Agreement for HIP, were offered to show irreparable injury to HIP - an element of
judicial dissolution. R. p. 140. The Court conceded the evidence of violations was offered "as the
basis for seekingjudicial resolution .... " R. p. 178. However, the Court then concluded that "Ralph
sought to enforce a variety of Operating Agreement provisions, for the purpose of obtaining
dissolution of the business entity, and he was unsuccessful in that pursuit." R. p. 178 (emphasis
added). Clearly, the Court did not reach this conclusion by an exercise of reason, because this
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rationale is internally inconsistent. One does not obtain judicial dissolution of a limited liability
company by enforcing an operating agreement. Judicial dissolution will render the operating
agreement of no effect.
The second action brought by Ralph sought declaratory relief under the Idaho Limited
Liability Company Act, not the HIP Operating Agreement. R. pp. 50-51. Again, this was not an
effort to enforce any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. Indeed, Ralph was able to bring
the action only because no provision of the HIP Operating Agreement precluded him from doing so.
Declaratory Complaint at 4 ,r,r 20-21 (R. p. 51).
Accordingly, neither of the actions brought by Ralph sought enforcement of any provision
of the HIP Operating Agreement. Therefore, the attorney fee provision in the HIP Operating
Agreement did not apply to either action. Thus, the Court erred in awarding fees under that
prov1s10n.
2. Roger and Lisa did not validly assert any provision
of the HIP Operating Agreement as a defense.
In defending both actions brought by Ralph, Roger and Lisa did not invoke any provision of
the HIP Operating Agreement as a defense. In the dissolution action, Roger and Lisa pied the
following as affirmative defenses: (I) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (2)
statute of frauds, and (3) waiver and estoppel. R. p. 8. In the action for declaratory judgment, Roger
and Lisa never filed an answer, but successfully moved for dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). R. pp.
169-170. Thus, Roger and Lisa did not rely on any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement in
defending either action.
3. The Court erred in ruling that the attorney fee provision
of the HIP Operating Agreement applied in this case.
The attorney fee provision of the HIP Operating Agreement applies in either of two instances:
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(1) where the action is brought to enforce any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement or (2)

where any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement is validly asserted as a defense. Operating
Agreement for Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C., at IX ,i 14(0), R. p. 62. As shown above,
neither situation applies to this case. Consequently, the Court erred in ruling the attorney fee
provision applied. If"specific enforcement" of the terms of the operating agreement is not the basis
of the suit, such an attorney fee provision will not apply. Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun

Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 591-92, 166 P.3d 374, 381-82 (2007). The Court reasoned that "[b]ut for the
contract in the form of the Operating Agreement, there would have been no reason nor opportunity
for Ralph to bring a lawsuit.. .. " R. p. 178. However, the mere existence of the agreement does not
entitle Roger and Lisa to attorney fees where the lawsuit was not brought to enforce the agreement.

Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927,937, 155 P.3d 1166, 1176 (2007).
CONCLUSION

In awarding attorney fees to Respondents, the trial court abused its discretion. First of all,
the Court acted beyond its discretion in applying the attorney fee provision of the HIP Operating
Agreement to a case where it was clearly not applicable. Neither lawsuit was brought to enforce any
provision of the operating agreement. Second, the trial court did not exercise reason in determining
to apply the attorney fee provision. After conceding that the lawsuits were attempts to obtain
dissolution of the limited liability company, the court then characterized the lawsuits as actions to

enforce provisions of the operating agreement. Again, this exceeded the bounds of the discretion
available to the court, given the plain terms of the provision at issue. Accordingly, the Appellant
requests this Court to reverse the district court in its award of attorney fees to the Respondents.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of November, 2008.

NORMAN G. REECE, P.C.

By

ff~4£, p.
Norman G. Reece, Jr., Attorney for Appellant
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